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Abstract: This article illuminates political transformations in a West Bank Palestinian town over 
the past decade by examining the ways stories of a killing which took place in 1981 produced 
radically different conceptions of community during the period of intensive intifada mobilisation 
and subsequently as the Palestinian National Authority established its rule in the wake of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Agreements. The paper examines how political arrangements between the 
Israeli state and the Palestinian administration forced the local community to negotiate intra-
communal conflicts in the terms of an archaic and divisive idiom of tribal law which in turn 
accelerated the disintegration of the nationalist solidarity which had characterized intifada-period 
social life. The paper contends that shared perceptions of antagonistic violence are central to 
processes of collective identity formation, and shows that discursive shifts can, in certain contexts, 
give rise to new formations of identity antipathetic to those which preceded them. 
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Many observers of - as well as many participants in - the Palestinian intifada (literally ‘shaking off’) 
saw the harbingers of a new Middle East in the radical forms of social and political organization 
thrown up by West Bank and Gazan Palestinians against the continuation of Israeli dominion over 
their homeland . Edward Said, introducing Lockman and Beinin’s Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising 
Against Israeli Occupation, saw the disappearance of social fragmentation, the marginalization of old 
forms of social organizations, and the elevation of women in the struggle to roles equivalent to 
those of men as “momentous changes ... [which will] surely have an effect throughout the Middle 
East as the twentieth century approaches its end” (Said 1989: 21). Such enthusiasm, however, 
began to erode as the intifada changed character in its latter years and after the intifada was called 
off following the secret Oslo Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Glenn Robinson’s Building a 
Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, written in 1995 but published in 1997, expresses in its 
title the frustration felt by many of those observers and participants as the Palestine National 
Authority began to consolidate its rule and halt the already faltering momentum of that earlier 
radicalism. By 1998 Lisa Taraki, a Palestinian sociologist, was noting that despite the radical 
reworkings of Palestinian society effected by widespread communal mobilization against the 
occupation the changes were not irreversible: “Traditional forces may assert or reassert themselves 
in different times and different forms....there are some indications that there may be a revival of the 
hamula [clan or extended family]2  structure in the areas of social support and political life” 
(Taraki 1998: n.p.).
This paper examines political and social changes which have taken place between the late 1980s 
and the present day in Beit Sahour, a small town a mile to the east of Bethlehem which garnered 
international fame for first articulating and enacting the strategy of civil disobedience which gave 
form to the first years of the intifada. The paper focuses on stories and activities devolving from the 
1981 killing of a young Beit Sahouri, Basem Rishmawi, and uses the ‘micro-politics’ of affiliation 
and antagonism which resulted from evolving understandings of why he was killed and who he 
was killed by to illuminate more widescale changes effecting post-intifada Palestinian society in 
general. The paper gives particular attention to ‘the revival of the hamula structure’ in the 
dynamics of everyday life, and attempts to show how political decisions on the national and 
international level shaped and constrained local political decisions so as to defeat moves towards 
using radical intifada-period means of envisaging community and dealing with conflict. In stressing 
that the ascendency of traditional forces in community life was - and continues to be - deeply 
contested, this paper shows the local community as an active, deeply political arena for assessing 
situations and engendering solutions and suggests that there is nothing inherently stable about the 
current hegemony of the ‘traditional’. To once again cite Taraki’s assessment of the state of 
contemporary Palestinian society, the “hegemony [of traditional forces] over political life is not a 
matter that has been settled, even in the short term” (Taraki 1998: n.p.).  
* * * 
The sheer brutality of the events remains. Sometime between eight and nine p.m. on the 23rd of 
March, 1981, Basem Rishmawi left his fiancee’s home in the West Bank town of Beit Sahour to 
walk the short distance to his family’s house. He never arrived. Five days later a late night call 
from the Bethlehem offices of the Israeli military police announced to his family that Basem’s body 
had been found on the 25th in the vicinity of the town dump. According to the Shin Bet officer who 
called, a military investigation had revealed that Rishmawi had been killed while preparing a bomb 
which had exploded prematurely. He announced that the body would be delivered that night to the 
Greek Orthodox church for interment. Soldiers, arriving before the body, allowed only around a 
dozen people - immediate family members and a priest - into the church and it was these who were 
able to briefly examine the corpse when it was delivered at approximately 1:30 a.m. on the 29th. It 
was immediately clear that there was something wrong with the officer’s story; although the body 
had been dismembered by an explosion, there seemed to be no connection between the damage 
that force had caused and other wounds such as heavy bruising on the face, multiple penetration 
wounds, and deep gouging - seemingly caused by brutally tight binding - on the wrists. As the 
mourners whispered amongst themselves that it appeared as though a bomb had been set off in or 
next to the body after death, armed soldiers watched over the brief funeral and the subsequent 
entombment in the family plot.
* * * * *
I first encountered Basem’s name and image in January 1990 after members of one of the town’s 
numerous intifada ‘committees’ had smuggled me into the town past roadblocks erected by the 
military authorities to enforce a siege imposed in response to Beit Sahour’s protracted maintenance 
of a tax strike3. Hung in a place of honour on the wall of the reception room of a house my ‘guides’ 
had brought me to was a picture of a solemn-looking young man. When I asked about it, I was told 
the story of Basem’s killing, and it was made clear that - although no one knew whether he had 
been killed by Jewish settlers or by Israeli soldiers - he was an arbitrarily-chosen victim of Israeli 
oppression of Palestinians: “it could have happened to anybody, and by chance the victim was 
Basem” (8.1.90)4. 
I would come across Basem’s picture again and again in the following days as I interviewed people 
whose houses and shops had been stripped by squads of soldiers led by tax collectors, whose 
husbands, fathers, sons or daughters had been imprisoned or were moving from house to house 
avoiding arrest, and whose will to revolt was fanned by the government’s attempts to break a town 
Jerusalem Palestinians characterised as “tougher than Gaza” (6.1.90). During that week 
informants repeatedly asserted that all Beit Sahourans - and by extension all Palestinians - were 
rendered equivalent by the activities of a occupying force which - in attacking a Palestinian 
presence - failed to distinguish between Muslim or Christian, male or female, young or old, rich or 
poor. A Christian shopkeeper told me “there is no difference; we are under the same conditions, 
the same oppression, the same hopes, the same policy...the occupation does not differentiate 
between Muslim and Christian” (8.1.90) and later a Muslim schoolteacher said “we live together as 
the same people; we feel there is another one who is enemy to us both” (11.1.90).
Basem - who had apparently been kidnaped, tortured to death, and then torn to pieces by his 
Israeli captors so that his remains could bear the brand ‘terrorist’ - stood in this situation as a sort 
of Palestinian Everyman. He - like other Beit Sahouris before him - had already suffered the 
martyrdom Palestinians under occupation could see as the inheritance they stood to receive so long 
as the logic of the Zionist occupation of Palestine held sway. When Edmond Ghanem was killed on 
the 18th of July 1988 by a soldier who dropped a building block on him from a guard post on top 
of a three story building, Beit Sahouris could see the event as yet more evidence of the presence of 
a systematic programme of extermination mobilised against them and this, like the killing of Basem 
Rishmawi, strengthened their resolve to protect themselves by uniting to fight the common enemy. 
Symptomatic of this collectively espoused resolve was the 1993 calendar published by the Arab 
Orthodox Club5  which displays, beneath an image of Beit Sahour prominently foregrounding 
Catholic and Orthodox churches as well as the town’s mosque, photographs of seventeen Beit 
Sahouris who shared not their religious affiliation but the fact that they, Muslim and Christian 
alike, had been martyred by the forces of occupation (six in 1992). 
The idiom of martyrdom became the language of community during the early days of the intifada. 
One man, telling me of the killings in Gaza which sparked off the intifada6, claimed his immediate 
response to the news of the murders was the thought “why am I not this man?” (8.1.90). He knew 
Israeli soldiers killed Palestinians simply because they were Palestinians and since he was 
Palestinian he was sure that it had just been a matter of contingency that he had not been one of 
the victims. It was his identification with this potential ‘fate’ that gave rise to his, and his 
neighbors’, resolve to overthrow an occupation which offered that future to all Palestinians: “We 
see that one day it is one person, and the next day another. The following day it may be us, so we 
say ‘Hellas’ [enough] and begin to work to stop it”7. The soldier’s (or settler’s) undifferentiating 
gaze created a defensive ‘Palestinian’ identity out of a society which, without that antagonism, 
might not have discerned a unity within the congeries of identities constituted by allegiances to 
family, class, religion and locale. 
Loss and victimisation at the hands of the collective enemy became, in the context of intifada, 
elements of a prestige economy. As I stood in the midst of scattered clothing, bedding, and broken 
furniture left behind after a tax raid on the apartment of a couple who ran a small electrical goods 
shop, the woman told me that “the people who have not had their things confiscated by the tax 
men are envious of those who have; it’s like building a new house” (10.1.90). In this potlatch-like 
counter-economy status accrued to those who ‘gave freely’ (and aggressively) to the enemy (Mauss 
1969: 31-45), and ‘new houses’ - stripped and desecrated by predatory military assaults - took the 
place of the tidy apartments and small houses of the pre-intifada years. Over the previous twenty 
years Beit Sahour had extensively developed an infrastructure of small local industry (much of it 
finishing clothing for the Israeli market) which had considerably raised the general standard of 
living above that of other West Bank communities. People with whom I spoke in 1990 prided 
themselves however in throwing back at the Israelis wealth which had come to seem no more than 
payment for accepting occupation. Beit Sahourans played a vanguard role in the uprising by 
refusing to pay taxes to the occupying government and by systematically disengaging from the 
Israeli economy. The Israeli response was draconian, but a recently-plundered pharmacist told me 
that “if the bedouin can live in tents, so can we. We have our agriculture and it is very good. The 
Jerusalem Post called us the ‘Japan of the Palestine/Israel’ but we can lose all that and go back to 
the fields” (12.1.90)8.
Landscape, history, sectarianism, and social organization were reworked in popular discourses 
which circulated through and constituted the self-professedly revolutionary community of that 
period. Parts of the town which had previously been designated by topographic features or by the 
names of important persons or families who had lived in the area were renamed so as to resonate 
with the myths of Palestinian resistance. The town’s highest sector (previously known as the ras or 
‘head’) was renamed ‘Shqeef Castle’ so as to recall a famed Palestinian victory while other sectors 
of the town became ‘Tell al-Za’ter’ and ‘Shateela’ to evoke militant refugee camps in the Lebanon9. 
When people spoke of local history they accentuated stories of coordinated resistances by the 
townspeople to earlier oppressions. I collected numerous accounts of Beit Sahour's resistance to 
the Ottoman draft during the First World War10, of Muslims and Christians marching together to 
the shrine of Nebi Musa to oppose the British Mandate, of an Orthodox priest who cached arms to 
fight the British during the 1936-1939 revolt, of Baathist, Nasserite and finally Communist 
demonstrations against the Jordanian occupation, and of the long history of Beit Sahouran support 
for the Popular and Democratic Fronts during the period of Israeli hegemony. In these the ‘we’ of 
an historic and enduring community was reified and affirmed11. Underplayed in - or simply 
excluded from - these narratives were past clashes with local Bedouin communities (the ta’amra), 
disputes over land ownership, struggles between classes, feuding between family groups, and the 
divisive responses of local Christians and Muslims to the differentiating policies of the various 
colonizing powers which had dominated the town. Beit Sahourans - at least in the presence of a 
foreign anthropologist12 - vied to relate stories of a past in which the most salient thing was the 
spirit of intercommunal solidarity against oppression which the narrators had extrapolated from 
the present situation.
These stories celebrated Beit Sahour’s overcoming of the temptation to divide along the lines 
provided by the towns persons’ various religious affiliations. In 1984 the Beit Sahouri population 
stood at 8,900 persons of which 17% were Sunni Muslim, 67% were Greek Orthodox, 8% were 
Roman Catholic, 6% were Greek Catholic, and 2% were Lutheran (Pena 1984)13. I cite below two 
statements - one by the Muslim schoolteacher quoted earlier and another by an Orthodox member 
of the medical committee which had smuggled me into town (itself made up a Muslim, two 
Orthodox and one Latin Christian) - which are representative of the statements Muslims and 
Christians alike made to me during the visit:
We do not remember we are from different religions unless somebody from outside reminds 
us....We [Muslims] carry arak [a local anis-flavored hard alcohol] and seeds to weddings; we bring 
to them what makes them happy. We are not fanatic; we do not have such sensitivities. We are 
trying to keep living in the same way, not being influenced by the occupation mentality. They [the 
Israelis] are trying to break apart a culture we have built over centuries (11.1.90);
and
It is you outside who try to make a difference between the Christians and the Muslims. We are a 
people, we all go to each other’s feasts, we visit with each other, we live the same life. We are one 
people (8.1.90).
That intercommunality was evident in public manifestations of solidarity such as the annual joint 
Christian-Muslim scout marches on Christmas day and the decision of the committees organizing 
the 'Day of Prayer for Peace' on 5 November 1989 to invite Shaikh Said al-Din al- Alami, Mufti of 
Jerusalem and head of the Islamic Council, to announce from the pulpit of Beit Sahour's Orthodox 
Church a fatwa (religious ruling) against the purchase of the confiscated Beit Sahouran goods 
Israeli tax officials were putting up for auction in Tel Aviv. It was also memorialized in the 
Municipality’s decision to refuse to allow any of the Holy Land’s churches to claim and build a 
shrine over the site of recent apparitions of the Virgin Mary in a cistern under the town market. It 
instead resolved to erect there a non-denominational municipal shrine (Bowman 1993: 448-451). 
That shrine’s caretaker, an Orthodox man employed by the Municipality, asserted “we are here 
Muslim and Christian, there are two Christian groups. The Municipality builds for all the people 
and the people all own and use the well” (12.1.90).
During the intifada local political activities were organised by thirty five ‘neighborhood committees’ 
representing thirty five neighborhoods. The activities of these committees were coordinated and 
issues pertaining to the whole of the town were dealt with by the Sulha, a parallel municipal 
authority established in 1989. Previously Beit Sahour’s internal political structures had been based 
on the town’s clans. Issues arising within a family or between families were debated in family 
forums and then forwarded through a clan elder to the Municipal council (constituted of 
representatives of the eight major families, six of which were Christian and two Muslim). This 
familial locus tended to ensure that municipal engagement in local issues pertained either to 
interfamilial or intersectarian disputes. Membership on the neighborhood committees was, 
however, decided by local elections which - in a town whose considerable twentieth century 
expansion had ensured that most neighborhoods were made up of two or more clan groupings - 
blunted the salience of the hamula groupings and focused committee discussions on concerns 
shared by all those living in the neighborhood; health care, security, provision of water, electricity, 
food, income for the families of people killed, injured or imprisoned, etcetera (14.3.1999). The Sulha 
was in turn directed by an executive committee elected by representatives of the twenty-two major 
political, cultural and social organizations in the town and was concerned with issues pertinent to 
the entirety of the town; raising money to support the needy, settling disputes, and coordinating 
responses to intifada situations (Robinson 1997: 80-81). The idiom of identity was thus transformed 
from one grounded on hamula and sect to one built on political struggle and the nation.
In what Robinson refers to as a ‘revolution’ (albeit ‘incomplete’), the Beit Sahouri community 
restructured not only its imaging of itself as a community but also the social and political structures 
through which it decided and expressed its collective will. Basem Rishmawi, although he was both 
a Greek Orthodox Christian and a member of the al-Qazaha hamula, was a symbol for Beit 
Sahouris throughout the years of intifada of what it meant to be a Palestinian under Israeli 
occupation. His martyrdom was a particularly gruesome and spectacular instance of what 
Palestinians in Beit Sahour and throughout the West Bank and Gaza learned under Likkud’s 
Sharon and then through the tutelage of Yitzak Rabin’s ‘iron fist policy’ (with its policy of 
breaking the bones and bulldozing the houses of stone throwers) was the fate they too could expect 
if the occupation were to continue. Basem’s sad yet severe gaze joined those of the other Beit 
Sahouri martyrs in gazing from the secular iconostases which were the poster-bedecked streets, the 
walls of the portrait-dense reception rooms of people’s houses, and the illustrated calendars in 
which the dates of the deaths of martyrs coexisted with those of people’s present and future. He 
and his comrades looked out over the people of Beit Sahour as they struggled to find ways of 
celebrating Palestinian identity without having to follow Basem’s path to a terrible death in a back 
road dumping ground. 
* * * * *
Basem’s name began to circulate again two years after the Oslo Agreements had brought the 
intifada to a close. In the summer of 1995, soon after Israeli troops withdrew from the Bethlehem 
region leaving it under the control of the Palestine National Authority, a Beit Sahouri named Faez 
Qumsiyyeh was arrested by Palestinian security for  non-political criminal activities. Under 
interrogation Faez confessed to having been involved - along with his cousin Sammer Qumsiyyeh 
and a local Muslim - in the murder of Basem Rishmawi. 
For the second time events related to the death of Basem Rishmawi engaged Beit Sahour: one 
woman, an affinal relative, told me “it was like he had been killed again, and all the Rishmawis and 
much of the rest of the town went into mourning” (19.12.97). This time, however, the story of his 
killing did not circulate in the midst of a burgeoning nationalist mobilization leading to intifada but 
instead accompanied a ‘winding down’ of commitment and solidarity in the wake of a partial 
amelioration of occupation. Since the heady days of the tax strike Beit Sahour’s fervor had been 
substantially diminished by the failure of the Palestine Liberation Organization to provide the 
support necessary to bulwark commitment in the face of fiercely punitive measures: 
the PLO in Tunis [had] failed to support Bayt Sahur’s [sic] campaign, as it feared the political 
consequences of such grassroots initiatives....Tunis’s - and particularly Yasir Arafat’s - disregard 
for Bayt Sahur’s campaign of civil disobedience was strongly felt by members of the new elite in 
Bayt Sahur [who]...were nearly unanimous in their view that Tunis not only did not support Bayt 
Sahur’s efforts but actually tried to thwart them by privately urging others to pay their taxes and 
by more closely aligning itself with members of the old elite (Robinson 1997: 88 and 89).
Communal solidarity began to unravel as those who had already lost considerable amounts of 
property grew increasingly aggrieved at others who, fearful of finding themselves in similar 
penury, began covertly to pay their taxes. 
After the arrests in March 1990 of the remaining members of the underground grassroots United 
National Leadership of the Uprising committees which had coordinated internal intifada strategy, 
the uprising was directed from outside by the various external factions (Fateh, Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Palestine People’s 
Party) operating semi-autonomously under the PLO umbrella. From then on political activity in 
Beit Sahour, as elsewhere in the Territories, was coordinated and carried out by competing 
political factions paid for their activism and remunerated for their losses by the outside 
organizations. Many argued this took the revolution away from the people and gave it to the 
politicians who destroyed it: “the intifada was made by those on the street and broken as soon as 
they began ‘throwing stones for money’”(29.7.94). Political factionalism and differential access to 
support and protection from loss eroded the sense of ‘equivalence’ which Laclau and Mouffe point 
out is a fundamental element of popular mobilisation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 63).
Tendencies towards fragmentation were aggravated by the peace settlement. This, although it 
failed to ameliorate day to day deprivations14, removed Israeli soldiers from the streets and hid the 
operations of the Israeli security apparatus behind the proxy Palestinian ‘Preventative Security 
Force’. Everyday evidence of ‘another one who is enemy to us both’ virtually disappeared, and as 
the focus that antagonist had provided diffused the sense of collective solidarity with which Beit 
Sahour had faced its enemy began to dissipate. 
To understand the role of the antagonist in the formation - and maintenance - of Palestinian 
identity one must comprehend the ways in which politicized identities develop out of those forms 
of identity characteristic of the everyday exchanges of communal life. In the development of 
Palestinian solidarity, differential aspects of identity - based on religion, class position, hamula 
affiliation, party membership, and even to some degree age and gender - were subsumed within an 
enveloping political and public identity. Thus a contingent political identity came to seem essential, 
while more ingrained and enduring identities were perceived as secondary or limited in salience. 
During my fieldwork in Jerusalem’s Old City between 1983 and 1985 I observed a discursive shift 
as Palestinians were forced by increasing hostile attention from soldiers, settlers and tax collectors 
to recognise that their communality as ‘Palestinians’ was more salient than the differences religious 
affiliation opened between them. People who in the early months of my fieldwork had called 
themselves ‘Palestinian Christians’ or ‘Palestinian Muslims’ pointedly began to reverse the order of 
the substantive and the adjectival so as to say “I am not a Palestinian Christian; I am a Christian 
Palestinian” (14.2.85 and passim) or “I am a Palestinian first, then a Muslim” (Bowman 1986: 5). In 
Beit Sahour elements of identity which made for difference were similarly encompassed by those 
supporting communal solidarity. A Catholic friend who was a committed activist marked a radical 
separation between the public space of national communalism and the private terrain of sectarian 
difference in telling me that “my relation with my god is in my heart and my house; it does not 
concern the public. In the street I am Aissa” (10.1.90).
Outstanding in such cases is the perceived presence of an antagonist which dissolves the 
differences between those it threatens. What creates the space of perceived communality are not 
the routines of everyday life structuring and manifesting systems of difference and orchestrating 
relations between the variant vertical and horizontal role positionings of age, class, gender, 
education, appearance, religion, etcetera but the presence of an antagonism is perceived to threaten 
all within its purview with either physical extermination or the wholesale extirpation of their 
differentiated, subsumed identities. In this sense the antagonism comes from ‘outside’ a system of 
social and cultural meanings and unifies what is inside as that which is at risk15. An antagonist is 
seen to put at risk a system’s capacity to create and maintain identities. Thus, in an example cited 
by Laclau and Mouffe, “it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with 
the landowner who is expelling him from his land” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125); without land 
the practices which make up the habitus of a peasant’s life are impossible to enact. In such 
situations the multiplex ‘being’ the antagonism threatens with impossibility shapes itself into an 
overarching political identity uniting all those who feel themselves at risk in the articulation of a 
counter-assertion which poses their collective being as an antithesis to the force working against 
them. More central than the diversity of the elements conjoined in opposition is the counterthrust 
of opposition itself; such political identity takes form as what, in Hegelian terms, one can call the 
negation of a negation. 
Although the threat of death figures centrally in evoking antagonism, it is the danger that 
communal identity will be destroyed that is more important than actual bodily destruction. An 
antagonist gives rise to political identities by threatening social death, and in the Palestinian 
instance, as elsewhere (see Pettigrew 1997), the death of the martyr is powerful because it 
prefigures the potential extermination of the social body for which the martyr’s body stands in. The 
threat Palestinians came to perceive the Israeli state as posing to them was not necessarily the 
threat of wholesale genocide (although as incidents in the Lebanon showed such genocide was not 
beyond belief) but what might be called ‘politicide’16. 
Zionism threatened the death of a nation, but not the literal destruction of all those bodies which 
made up the Palestinian people. Golda Meir’s famed assertion that Palestine was “a land without a 
people for a people without a land” discursively constructed the land of Palestine (which was to 
become Israel) as empty of a ‘people’ even though it might be populated by ‘persons’. Those 
persons could live in Israel as ‘Israeli Arabs’ but under the Zionist ideology there was no place for 
them as ‘Palestinians’.  So long as Palestinians were ‘Arabs’ - a subordinate and stateless group 
with no inherent link to the specific territory the Israelis claimed as their own - they could be 
tolerated as labourers within the Zionist state. Rabbi Aviner of the Gush Emunim settlers’ 
movement makes this clear: 
the sons of Ismael among us have a right to live on the land, but, needless to say, this is true only 
on condition that they accept the Kingdom of Israel, agree that political sovereignty belongs to the 
People of Israel, and are prepared to be loyal and obedient citizens of the state. As Maimonides 
says: “They must not raise a head in Israel, but be submissive under hand” (quoted in Karpin and 
Friedman 1999: 42). 
Palestinian assertions of ‘Palestinian’ identity and their attempts to retain a grip on lands being 
expropriated by state and settler activities marked them as antagonistic to Israel’s state-building 
project and rendered them subject to various forms of violence, ranging from expropriation and 
expulsion through to assassination and - with Israel’s 1982 attempt to destroy the PLO in the 
Lebanon - extermination17.
That process of identity formation had been visible in Beit Sahour in the period leading up to and 
through the first years of the intifada. By the time Faez Qumsiyya confessed to killing Basem 
Rishmawi, however, consensus on Israel’s antagonism had been eroded not only by factionalization 
but as well by the sense of many that the Palestine National Authority’s establishment was the first 
step of an inexorable progress towards Palestinian statehood. That perception transformed the 
Israeli state from a force with the disallowal of a Palestinian state and people as its modus vivendi to a 
partner in mutually beneficial contractual relations with a Palestinian entity. ‘Palestinian’ - when 
no longer the marker of a domain at risk but instead the collective label of those gathered within 
the embrace of a territorially defined state - loses its defensive salience, and new articulations of 
identity, spawned by new perceptions of antagonism operating within the Palestinian community 
rather than against that community as a whole, can begin to emerge (see Bowman 1994). It was in 
such a context that the ‘second death’ of Basem Rishmawi would be interpreted, and acted upon, in 
ways very different from those which followed on his ‘first death’. 
The significant difference between the knowledge which circulated after Basem’s ‘first death’ and 
that which followed his ‘second’ is that while the perpetrators of the ‘first’ were known to be 
national ‘others’ - either soldiers or settlers - those who killed Basem the ‘second’ time were known 
to be Beit Sahouris. The devastating implications of that emerges strongly from the response of one 
informant to my query about the possibility of a revenge killing: “no one in Beit Sahour kills others 
in Beit Sahour’’ (16.4.98)18. The fact that the second killing showed precisely that Beit Sahouris 
could kill Beit Sahouris not only invalidated that adage but threatened to dissolve the community 
itself. 
The description of Basem’s killing which emerged was particularly ugly. As Basem got into a car 
which had stopped to offer him a ride as protection from the rain, he was overcome and bound 
with wire by the three men inside - Faez Qumsiyyeh, Faez’s cousin Sammer, and an unnamed 
man, a Muslim. The three then drove him to the valley where his body was later found where they 
tortured him. The torture, according to those who spoke of it, was not motivated by any desire for 
knowledge but by a combination of sheer sadistic pleasure and the fact that Sammer Qumsiyyeh 
felt that Basem had once slighted him. Basem was beaten and his face, arms and body burned with 
cigarettes. He was cut in his stomach, arms and legs, and chained to the bumper of the car and 
dragged along the road. Finally he was stabbed to death. The body was disposed in the rubbish 
dump as an intentional gesture of degradation and shaming (19.12.97 and other locations).
It is difficult to discern the source of these details as it seems unlikely that Faez - except under 
extreme duress - would have divulged such information. Many attributed the knowledge to a file 
alleged to have been left behind when Israeli security abandoned the Bethlehem police station. The 
file, clearly labeled ‘Basem Rishmawi’, indicated that the three men, under instructions from 
Bishara Qumsiyyeh - Sammer’s father - had kidnaped and executed Basem because of Basem’s 
association with Fateh. People claimed the file supplied details of the torture and the killing as well 
as of Shin Bet’s subsequent recovery and deceptive mutilation of it19.
Regardless of whether or not the file existed, there was no doubt of Bishara Qumsiyyeh’s 
involvement. Bishara Qumsiyyeh had been leader of the Bethlehem region ‘Village League’20 
throughout the 1980s, and ran an Israeli-armed ‘militia’ of thugs and criminals which imposed a 
reign of terror on Beit Sahour and neighboring sites of nationalist sentiment such as Bethlehem 
University. Although it had been believed before the ‘second death’ that League members never 
killed Palestinians, the League was well known for collaboration and acts of intimidation. In the 
late 1980s members broke up and sprayed with gunfire the premises of the Arab Orthodox Club. 
One of the great victories of the intifada in Beit Sahour was the defeat of the Village League; in 
March 1988 Bishara Qumsiyyeh was forced to mount the pulpit of the Orthodox church to 
confess, before a capacity crowd, to having been a collaborator and to renounce further association 
with the military.
Rishmawi’s murder fitted the Village League agenda perfectly. Basem had, six months before his 
killing, broke with the Palestine People’s Party (Communist) to join Fateh (telephone interview: 
14.1.99) which had arranged for his training in guerilla camps in Syria during a supposed family 
visit to Jordan (14.1.99, 13.3.99). In light of this, it is not clear why Beit Sahouris did not assess 
the killing as a straightforward expression of Israeli antagonism. It was certainly known that the 
Village Leagues had worked as extra-legal extensions of Israeli rule, and the role of the military in 
returning the body implicated it in the murder. Nonetheless, despite clear indicators that Basem 
had been executed by agents carrying out an explicit Israeli policy of eliminating PLO operatives 
in the Occupied Territories, the town took the killing as very much an intra-communal concern. 
The town had, in effect, been given no choice. The Palestinian officials who had overseen Faez’s 
confession refused to try Faez and his accomplices for collaboration and murder, and instead 
instructed the Rishmawi and Qumsiyyeh families to settle the case between them by Atwah, or 
tribal law (16.12.97). Many Beit Sahouris believe that unpublished agreements behind the Oslo 
Accords prevented the Palestinian judiciary from prosecuting collaborators Israel considered 
sufficiently important to protect (13.12.97). Bishara Qumsiyyeh had been named in Faez’s 
confession and would have been implicated had a trial been allowed to proceed21. As the families 
involved knew of Faez’s confession (he had repeated it to his parents and asked them to arrange 
reconciliation with Basem’s family), the only way to quiet the case and its dangerous ramifications 
quickly was to hand it over to them, through the medium of tribal law, for extra-judicial settlement. 
The police clearly wanted the case closed quickly and intervened at several points to insist that 
rapid progress be made towards an amenable settlement (16.12.97); when at one point they feared 
the Rishmawis would refuse a settlement they arrested and beat Basem’s brother and another 
Rishmawi to let the family know they would not tolerate the case being dragged on (telephone 
interview, 14.1.99; field notes, 15.3.99). 
The problem posed to the town by the case being handed over to tribal law, rather than pursued 
under ‘general law’, is that the categories involved in the former are collective whereas the latter 
deals with individuals. Atwah, or tribal law22, is designed to negotiate the payment of blood money 
in cases of inter-group rivalries so as to effect a reconciliation between two groups forced into 
hostilities by the actions of individual members. Beit Sahour, however, did not see itself as 
constituted by separate groups, and many remained advocates of the communal solidarity evinced 
during the intifada and were convinced of the danger to the town of treating the acts of individual 
agents in terms of collective responsibility. Relations within Beit Sahour - particularly amongst the 
Christian families - were tightly imbricated, and although one could distinguish nominally between 
distinct hamulas (and within each of them between individual ’ailahs , or constituent extended 
families) the interrelations between these were formally and informally dense. While any murder of 
townsperson by townsperson in a small town is potentially explosive, the murder of a Rishmawi by 
a Qumsiyyeh was particularly divisive insofar as both are ’ailahs of the al-Qazaha hamula (to which 
forty percent of the town’s population belongs) and both families are almost exclusively Greek 
Orthodox (the religious community to which two thirds of the town’s population is affiliated). 
Were extended family loyalties to predominate over communal loyalties a wedge would be driven 
through the midst of one of the town’s two major clans and - insofar as intermarriage between 
members of the two ’ailahs are not uncommon - nuclear families would be riven. Furthermore, 
although parallel cousin marriages occur in Beit Sahour, marriages between Christian families 
often not only cross hamula boundaries but also knit together couples (and thus families) across 
sectarian divides23. People stressed that almost every Christian in the town, with the exception of 
some who came - or whose families came - to Beit Sahour as refugees in 1948 and after 196724, 
were related - directly, through ties of god-parenthood, or both - to both the Qumsiyyeh and 
Rishmawi families. The children of one of my primary informants (who was of the Al-Jaraysah 
clan) were god-parented by Rishmawis, while his brother’s children were god-parented by 
Qumsiyyehs. A feud between Rishmawis and Qumsiyyehs would impede if not block the operation 
of a number of kin and patronage networks linking Christian Beit Sahouris across a multitude of 
fields. The Orthodox community, which currently shares a single church, would risk a split. The 
Arab Orthodox Club, with representatives of each of these ’ailahs in its governing positions, would 
be disrupted by hostilities and would, if it survived, no longer represent or serve as a forum for the 
whole of the (male) community. Finally, the town itself - which has a minority Muslim population 
yet which is sited in a region with a Muslim majority - might be placed at risk if the issue of the 
third man - who no one would name and many would not even indicate was Muslim - opened 
hostilities between Muslims and Christians. 
As a result, when representatives of the families of Faez and Sammer Qumsiyyeh25 approached 
the Rishmawis to request a truce so that negotiations over blood money could be initiated, a 
number of moves were made by towns persons and community organizations to bridge the gaps 
prized open by the violence of the events. 
One of the first moves made was the renunciation of Faez Qumsiyyeh (and by implication the 
entirety of his immediate family) by the elders of other Qumsiyyeh families in the town and their 
reiteration of their 1988 rejection of the family of Bishara and Sammer26. Although it was 
generally held to be inconceivable that anyone other than a “psychopath” (15.1.99) would think of 
taking vengeance on the families,  form was, nonetheless, followed, and the delegations which 
approached the Rishmawi elders to sue for peace did not include Qumsiyyehs but were composed 
of spokesmen from other Sahouri families through which the families of the killers had chosen to 
speak. The guarantors confessed the guilt of their respective clients and promised that an 
agreement on blood money payment would be reached. In response elders from the Rishmawi 
family guaranteed that no revenge would be taken. 
The Rishmawi response to the Qumsiyyeh admission of responsibility was far from unanimous; 
questions of who would negotiate the settlement and what sort of settlement it would be had to be 
worked through. The Rishmawi ’ailah is large, and in the crowded maglis27  in which the 
representatives of its many households gathered discussion went on far into the night over how the 
case would be handled. The divide lay between two camps. One, which contained many of those 
who had been active participants in intifada mobilization, said the killing was a political act which 
had been carried out against ‘the nation’. Negotiations should therefore be handled by ‘the national 
front’, in other words by a committee made up of representatives of the political parties active in 
the town. The other camp was occupied by two groups with distinct agendas which could 
nonetheless both be met by threating the matter as a family affair. The larger of the two was 
concerned to ensure that Basem’s family got the greatest possible settlement out of the 
negotiations. Basem, as his parents’s eldest son, would have been their chief support and the family 
- since his death - had been impovershed by his father’s subsequent stroke. This group was 
concerned that while a settlement between the Qumsiyyehs and a bloc made up of the national 
parties would serve to ‘build bridges’ and thus to end the threat of factionalization within the town, 
it would result in only a nominal payment of blood money and would leave Basem’s family little 
better off than it was at present. The other party in the ‘anti-national’ bloc was that of the 
traditionalists, and although this was neither a popular nor a powerful position it was held by 
several of old men who felt their authority had been eroded through the years of popular 
mobilization28. They wanted things done ‘properly’, and were anxious to prevent yet another 
‘coup’ by the political forces which had usurped power they felt belonged in the hands of the 
deals with individuals. Atwah, or tribal law22, is designed to negotiate the payment of blood money 
in cases of inter-group rivalries so as to effect a reconciliation between two groups forced into 
hostilities by the actions of individual members. Beit Sahour, however, did not see itself as 
constituted by separate groups, and many remained advocates of the communal solidarity evinced 
during the intifada and were convinced of the danger to the town of treating the acts of individual 
agents in terms of collective responsibility. Relations within Beit Sahour - particularly amongst the 
Christian families - were tightly imbricated, and although one could distinguish nominally between 
distinct hamulas (and within each of them between individual ’ailahs , or constituent extended 
families) the interrelations between these were formally and informally dense. While any murder of 
townsperson by townsperson in a small town is potentially explosive, the murder of a Rishmawi by 
a Qumsiyyeh was particularly divisive insofar as both are ’ailahs of the al-Qazaha hamula (to which 
forty percent of the town’s population belongs) and both families are almost exclusively Greek 
Orthodox (the religious community to which two thirds of the town’s population is affiliated). 
Were extended family loyalties to predominate over communal loyalties a wedge would be driven 
through the midst of one of the town’s two major clans and - insofar as intermarriage between 
members of the two ’ailahs are not uncommon - nuclear families would be riven. Furthermore, 
although parallel cousin marriages occur in Beit Sahour, marriages between Christian families 
often not only cross hamula boundaries but also knit together couples (and thus families) across 
sectarian divides23. People stressed that almost every Christian in the town, with the exception of 
some who came - or whose families came - to Beit Sahour as refugees in 1948 and after 196724, 
were related - directly, through ties of god-parenthood, or both - to both the Qumsiyyeh and 
Rishmawi families. The children of one of my primary informants (who was of the Al-Jaraysah 
clan) were god-parented by Rishmawis, while his brother’s children were god-parented by 
Qumsiyyehs. A feud between Rishmawis and Qumsiyyehs would impede if not block the operation 
of a number of kin and patronage networks linking Christian Beit Sahouris across a multitude of 
fields. The Orthodox community, which currently shares a single church, would risk a split. The 
Arab Orthodox Club, with representatives of each of these ’ailahs in its governing positions, would 
be disrupted by hostilities and would, if it survived, no longer represent or serve as a forum for the 
whole of the (male) community. Finally, the town itself - which has a minority Muslim population 
yet which is sited in a region with a Muslim majority - might be placed at risk if the issue of the 
third man - who no one would name and many would not even indicate was Muslim - opened 
hostilities between Muslims and Christians. 
community’s traditional leadership. 
As it was, this latter group ‘settled’ the issue by taking it out of the hands of the family. After a 
night of unresolved argument, one or more of its members drove to the neighboring Bedouin 
village of Ta’amra and reported there to the elders, who traditionally would have been those 
approached to serve as qudaa (judges), that they had been insulted by the national bloc within the 
Rishmawi family. The old men demanded an apology, implying that without one they would not be 
available as qudaa for Beit Sahour in the future. When this was reported to the representatives of 
the national grouping the group walked out of the negotiations in disgust.
Thus a discursive shift made it impossible to deal directly with the case in national political terms. 
Ironically, despite the translation of the terms of the dispute into the traditional familial idiom, the 
community - including all the Beit Sahouri Qumsiyyehs not in the nuclear families of Faez and 
Sammer - remained in fervent opposition to those implicated in the killing. In Beit Sahouri eyes the 
case remained a political issue concerning the whole town despite the fact that the machineries of 
presentation and negotiation brought into play necessitated that it be dealt with as though it were 
an issue between two ‘ailah (family groups). Over the next several days men representing various 
non- familial collectivities in the town (the Orthodox Club, the political parties, the churches, the 
unions, the scout groupings, and so on) met with Rishmawi family elders to familiarize them with 
the implications of the case for their groups, for the town, and for the national cause in general. In 
addition, one Beit Sahouri - a senior member of the PNA’s Southern Region ‘intelligence service’ 
(muhaabaraat) - told the Rishmawis exactly what the National Authority expected to emerge from 
the negotiations. 
Anxiety escalated as the conditions for the sulha (reconciliation ceremony) were discussed because 
of fear that the amount of blood money the Rishmawis would demand might prove to be so high 
that the Qumsiyyeh families would refuse to pay it, thus instigating the breakdown of the truce and 
the outbreak of feud. Atwah is not a coercive system grounded in state power but a system of 
reconciliation grounded on the assumption that those who embrace it consider continued sociality 
to be more important than the occasional expenses accrued in maintaining it. Traditionally blood 
money payments ensure peaceful relations between groups placed in a state of potential war, 
disarming the warring groups by establishing emergent commensality between them and binding 
those groups with formal ties of obligation through the arrangement of a number of deferred 
payments until these bonds can be replaced by less onerous ties of friendship and even marriage 
(see Peters 1990: 64-65 and 170). In Beit Sahour the intervention of extra-familial groups who 
considered the case in terms of the interests of wider communities was provoked by awareness of 
the severity of the crime (involving not only torture and the fatal spilling of blood but as well the 
intentional dishonoring of the corpse) as well as of the extremely long delay between the time the 
crime was committed and the time when the delegations from the families of Faez and Sammer 
Qumsiyyeh approached the Rishmawi maglis. While the calculated infliction of pain and 
humiliation rendered the crime more heinous than either an undeliberated act of passion or, as is 
often the case behind blood money negotiations, a simple accident29, the long delay between when 
the murder was carried out and when its perpetrators confessed (or, as many suspected, were 
forced to confess) suggested that the commitment of the perpetrators to peace with the Rishmawis 
was at best pragmatic (14.3.99). It was clear that the spirit of desired reconciliation which should 
accompany atwah was absent on the part of the Qumsiyyehs, and the fear of those who could see 
the wider implications was that the Rishmawis would respond with what would in effect be a 
compensatory act of violence by demanding full compensation for the loss and dishonoring30.
On the night of the sulha, which took place in the hall of the Greek Catholic convent, the “whole 
town” gathered because “everyone - even [other members of the Qumsiyyeh] family - had suffered 
badly under the league” and all were concerned about how the affair would be resolved (14.3.99, 
15.3.99). The meeting was convened under the jurisdiction of a noted sheikh from Hebron, a major 
Palestinian city twenty miles to the south of Beit Sahour, who had been chosen to act as qaadi 
(judge) by the Rishmawis with the agreement of the representatives of the Qumsiyyehs31. The size 
of the meeting, its public character, and the prestige of its arbitrator were all unusual, as was the 
character of the negotiations. Usually, as one of my informants told me, the arbitration was simple, 
quickly effected, and, finally, convivial: 
normally, even when a person was killed, the killer’s representatives would go to the family of the 
person killed, apologise profoundly (how can you refuse when the old men are humbling 
themselves and the entire family is putting itself in your debt?...) and then work ritually through 
‘we need a million shekels’, then ‘and here is 100,000 for Mohammed and 100,000 for Jesus’ until 
there was nothing to be paid. This is about good will and needs to be done within at most three 
days (14.3.99: see also Granqvist 1965: 122-123 and Haddad 1920: 107). 
Here, however, the good will was lacking. The Rishmawi family made an initial demand which, 
while high, would have allowed a series of reductions to a price which could easily be paid, even by 
Faez’s family which - unlike Sammer’s - was not well off. In response, however, the representatives 
of Faez’s family and that of Sammer and Bishara made a counter offer which was ludicrously low 
for intentional murder (i.e., 9000 Jordanian dinars). This hostile bargaining breached convention 
and threatened the negotiations with breakdown. After interventions by the extra-familial 
spokespersons who had earlier discussed the case with the Rishmawis negotiations continued. An 
agreement was finally reached (and approved by the qaadi) that the two Qumsiyyeh families would 
each pay 20,000 Jordanian dinars32 as a first payment with subsequent payments adding up to no 
more than 18,000 further dinars to be arranged and made at later dates. Faez’s negotiators spoke 
with his father and returned to announce his agreement. Those who spoke for Sammer left the hall 
to relay to Bishara the qaadi’s decision and returned a few minutes later to announce that Bishara 
had said that Sammer had been forced to confess by beating, that he’d not been involved, and that 
he would pay nothing (14.3.99 and passim).
The immediate response was collective outrage. Bishara’s initial representatives as well as the 
negotiators he appointed had repeatedly admitted that the family accepted Sammer’s guilt and its 
own responsibility for making blood payments. The last moment renunciation broke the truce, and 
while some said the qaadi announced that any Rishmawi had the right to kill any of the males of 
Bishara’s immediate family (14.3.99) others claimed there was no need to announce it when the 
deal was refused since everyone knew it (15.3.99). En masse the crowd - including other 
Qumsiyyehs - broke from the church hall and headed for the house of Bishara and Sammer in 
order to burn it down. A neighbor  who worked for the Palestinian security forces knew that 
women were living in the house and, fearing they might be killed, hid in a field and fired his 
machine gun in the air. The crowd - assuming Bishara and armed supporters were in the house - 
dispersed, and PNA forces came in to clear the house and establish order33. 
For the next couple of weeks an uneasy peace reigned. Arrangements had been reached with the 
father of Faez Qumsiyyeh, and although he was unhappy at having to sell land to pay blood money 
there was no feud between his family and the Rishmawis. Bishara, from within Israel, sold his 
house to the husband of his daughter so as to formally protect it from being damaged in feud 
vengeance. Sammer was safe in prison although he, like his father, was liable to be killed by any 
Rishmawi that saw them (18.12.97)34. No one - see below - spoke of the third man other than to 
say he was safe in a collaborators’ village in Israel. Most, if not all, of the 20,000 dinars was given 
to the parents of Basem. 
Two weeks after the debacle in the church hall Faez died in prison. The official PNA version was 
that he died of natural causes, but Beit Sahouris  believed that Bishara had had him killed to lift 
the onus from his son and, indirectly, from himself (16.12.97, 19.12.97 and passim)35. Faez’s father 
claimed that, regardless of who had killed Faez - and he implied it was a Rishmawi - Faez’s death 
satisfied the principle of ‘blood for blood’ - a death had been followed by a death. He said not only 
that all debts were off but also demanded, even before Faez’s funeral, that the Rishmawis return 
his 20,000 dinars (15.3.99). 
The Rishmawi response was furious. The negotiations in the church hall had left them substantially 
slighted, not only by the initial Qumsiyyeh offer of 9,000 dinars and the violation of ritual that 
offer effected but also by the relatively small amount of the agreed settlement. Faez’s father’s 
demand that the 20,000 dinars be returned came across as more violence against the concept of 
community which underlay both atwah and Beit Sahour: “the point of blood money is not about the 
cost of a crime (for instance the medical care of a victim) but about making a statement of apology 
and reconciliation. Faez’s family’s demand for the money is an obscenity” (19.12.97). This event, 
for some of the Rishmawis, was the last in a series of provocations directed towards their family by 
the Qumsiyyehs. As insult after insult seemed to emerge from the same ‘ailah which had earlier 
tortured a Rishmawi to death, a number of Rishmawis began increasingly to argue that the killing 
and the events which followed were neither political nor criminal but antagonistic expressions of 
one ‘lineage’ towards another. Although others - both within the Rishmawi ‘ailah and outside of it - 
continued to struggle against this interpretation by arguing that the events were spawned and 
fostered by the antagonism of the Israeli state towards the Palestinian people as a whole and 
towards the townsfolk in particular, their voices began to be muted by the growing inter-familial 
fracas. 
One impediment to feud, however, was the presence of a substantial number of Qumsiyyehs in the 
bloc mobilized against Sammer, Bishara and Faez. Qumsiyyehs had been as much persecuted by 
the activities of the Village League as had other Beit Sahouris, and one informant told me that 
Bishara - in the heyday of his powers - had made a particular point of refusing favors to other 
Qumsiyyehs to show that he was beholden to no one (14.3.1999). For the identity politics of the 
situation to move fully into the idiom of family and lineage such situationally-drawn delineations 
had to be effaced, and this erasure was effected during Faez’s funeral by one of the Rishmawis who 
photographed all of the Qumsiyyehs who attended and then circulated the ‘incriminating’ 
photographs amongst the Rishmawis. According to the photographer, and those who took him 
seriously, the presence at Faez’s funeral of a large percentage of the town’s Qumsiyyehs was 
testimony to the fact that they were loyal to Faez despite having renounced him to escape 
responsibility for the murder. The photographer’s charges seemed to be given even greater 
credence by the fact that those Qumsiyyehs who had been ostentatiously photographed leaving 
Faez’s funeral were understandably nervous about attending the funeral two days later of an 
elderly Rishmawi who had recently died36. Those Rishmawis who wished to provoke hostilities 
between the two families were able to claim that the Qumsiyyehs had chosen to attend the funeral 
of a Rishmawi killer rather than to offer condolences to the Rishmawis for the loss of one of their 
family.
Despite the fact that not all Rishmawis and Qumsiyyehs accepted their placement in the newly 
polarized social terrain, the charge served to constitute two antagonistic camps made up 
respectively of all Rishmawis and all Qumsiyyehs. Those Rishmawis who felt that family honor 
had suffered in the course of the Sulha and what ensued were able, through mobilizing a rhetoric of 
hostility to ‘those’ who had humiliated them, to reassert the strength and honor of the Rishmawis 
(see Stirling 1960 for an analogous case). The members of Faez’s immediate family, who felt 
resentment about the fact that they had been left to carry the financial burden of paying off the 
Rishmawis, in turn found it in their interest to implicate other Qumsiyyehs in the burgeoning feud 
with the Rishmawis so that the 20,000 dinars Faez’s father had been forced to pay would be 
returned as a consequence either of a strong bloc of kin support consolidating behind him or 
because an eventual outbreak of feud violence would abrogate the terms of the settlement. 
On several occasions over the subsequent three and a half years violence has broken out between 
Rishmawi and Qumsiyyeh youths, and although to date careful counsel has prevented these 
eruptions of the underlying hostilities from developing into more extensive feuding nothing has 
been resolved (15.3.99 and passim). Faez’s father continues to demand his 20,000 dinars back while 
the Rishmawi elders  continue to assert not only that that demand is a violation of the Sulha 
agreement but also that the failure of Faez’s family to make the final payment (teyba) programmed 
into the agreement means that the reconciliation process has broken down. Things are, in effect, in 
abeyance, and although no substantial violence between Qumsiyyehs and Rishmawis has broken 
out and caused the suspended antagonisms to coalesce into open feud neither has any move by 
nationalist or trans-familial forces in the town succeeded in breaking the deadlock and restoring 
commensality between those involved. 
The Rishmawi-Qumsiyyeh feud, like the Israeli Occupation, has withdrawn into the shadows but 
is far from forgotten. Both violences underlie the surfaces of everyday interaction within Beit 
Sahour, and an upsurge of violence from either could serve to mobilize the town. If that violence 
were to come from the occupation - for instance out of serious and threatening confrontations over 
settler expropriation of Beit Sahouri land on Jebel Abu-Ghneim (or, as the Israeli press calls the 
planned site of a massive new settlement, Har Homa) - the town would be likely once again to 
sublimate its internal divisions and unite to present a consolidated front to a shared enemy. If, on 
the other hand, a fight between Rishmawi or Qumsiyyeh youths should lead to bloodshed or if a 
Rishmawi, arguing that the failure to pay teyba nullified the truce, were to take vengeance on a 
member of Faez’s family, an open feud would erupt which would, at least temporarily, shatter the 
structures of sociality which hold Beit Sahour together. 
* * * * *
I have attempted through this ethnography to show how ‘ways of telling’ shape the possibilities of 
response to events in the life of a community. The ‘first death’ of Basem Rishmawi articulated, for 
the majority of inhabitants of Beit Sahour, a model capable of giving shape to a Manichaean world 
made up of an imagined community and another grouping antagonistic to that community. It 
impelled strategies of social consolidation and resistance appropriate to the maintenance of the 
community it helped to bring into conscious being. However, as the context in which that story 
circulated was transformed by political and social developments so too was the story’s significance. 
Although one might argue that what happened in 1995 was that ‘people got their facts right’ and 
therefore a ‘true story’ replaced a ‘false story’, what I have tried to show is that the rectification of 
the ‘facts’ - the realization that Palestinian collaborators working for the Israelis killed Basem 
rather than Israelis themselves - would have had little if any effect had there not already been a 
very substantial shift in the perspectives of Beit Sahouris on issues of politics, identity, nation and 
community. Within the terms of nationalist discourse the question of whether an Israeli soldier 
following the orders of his superiors kills a Palestinian or whether a Palestinian collaborator 
following the orders of his Israeli superiors does the deed, is moot; in each instance the deed is a 
political assassination carried out by an agent of the national enemy in accordance with that 
enemy’s plans to eradicate the nation. That the ‘second death’ of Basem Rishmawi came instead to 
be, for many, an expression of the antagonism of one Beit Sahouri family grouping for another 
demonstrates the ascendency of a different mode of interpretation. Antagonism, which I have 
argued serves to construct solidarities amongst those who perceive it as threatening, came to be 
seen as inter-familial in the post-Oslo context, and the ascendency of that idiom ‘muted’ 
interpreters who continued to argue that the real antagonism came from the Israeli state. That 
muting, however, did not simply silence voices but engendered situations in which a nationalist 
response was seen as inappropriate and extraneous. 
The hegemonization of the familial idiom of interpretation and the overturning of the nationalist 
idiom was not a simple matter of will, choice, and the fickleness of interpreters. Through the details 
of the story of a story which I have relayed above we can see the operations of the convoluted logic 
of contingency. The contexts within which various interpretations of the torture and murder of 
Basem Rishmawi are situated and elaborated are themselves dense with the accretion of a 
multitude of other articulations as well as with the institutional structures (some active, some 
latent) which have taken shape as persons in the past and present have used those articulations as 
models for activities. An event in the process of being interpreted and fixed in its meaning by a 
consensus has - like a pinball dropping through various channels and rebounding from flippers and 
barriers - to ‘negotiate’ a multitude of switching points, and at each of these shifts can be effected in 
the way the event is interpreted and in the consequences it will come to have. If the inequities of 
power underlying the Oslo Accords hadn’t led to the PNA’s vow not to prosecute collaborators..., 
if the old men in the Rishmawi family and of the Ta’amra hadn’t been resentful of the undermining 
of traditional structures of authority..., if Faez hadn’t died in prison..., if the photographer hadn’t 
had the equipment or the will to photograph the persons at the Qumsiyyeh funeral...things would 
not have developed as they did. Some of those ‘switching points’ are more stable than others; the 
decision of the PNA to turn the case over to tribal law inserted the deliberations on the significance 
of the case into a traditional structure which could only work in familial terms. The translation of 
the events into the idiom of family which that time-honored institution had effected can in turn be 
seen to over-determine the far more idiosyncratic decision of the photographer to extend the 
borders of the antagonism to the limits of the Qumsiyyeh ‘ailah. 
Although after more and more interpretative decisions are made the range of options which 
succeeds is substantially reduced, the force of contingency still prevails. In this case there is no way 
that the analyst, poring over this dense interweaving of interpretations and events, can assess how 
things will turn out. Although the logic of events has substantially closed down the ways in which 
the community can negotiate the implications of the murder of Basem Rishmawi, the historic 
context in which that logic operates still retains the power to transform its course and its meaning. 
If, in the near future, an Israeli settler or soldier building Jewish homes on the outskirts of Beit 
Sahour shoots a Beit Sahouri demonstrator things will develop very differently than if, in the 
course of a normal weekday, a Rishmawi or Qumsiyyeh schoolboy gets caught up in a school 
ground argument over a girl and stabs a youth from the other family. Whatever happens - and it 
may be neither of these - the unfolding of future events will in turn scatter new stories, acts, and 
interpretations over those which have already been accreting around this event since 1981, and the 
commingling of these two bodies of stories will in turn engender new events and new 
configurations of sociality. 
* * * * *
Postscript: The Third Man
Throughout my research into the way Beit Sahouris negotiated the dilemmas thrown up by the 
murder of Basem Rishmawi, none of my informants would tell me the name of the ‘third man’ 
implicated in the killing. It is not that people didn’t know who he was, or where he had lived, or 
where he was at present; it was just that people didn’t want to talk about him. People would say he 
wasn’t important either because he had lived outside of Beit Sahour or because he had disappeared 
and couldn’t be tried for the crime. Others would however let slip in passing that he was a Beit 
Sahouri who had lived quite near to Bishara Qumsiyyeh and that he had recently been seen living 
in Israel in a collaborator village on the road between Jenin and Afula. When I repeated this 
information to people who denied his importance, or argued that by the rules of ‘Atwah it didn’t 
really matter whether or not the culprit could be located if his family could, my informants would 
look uncomfortable and change the subject. I have never been able to collect more information 
about this man, about whether and why the PNA refused to allow him to be implicated and tried in 
the case, or about the relations of his family with the rest of the Beit Sahouri community. The 
‘third man’ was beyond the bounds of the story, and his family had not been called to account in 
the course of the sulha negotiations.
On the last day of my most recent visit to Beit Sahour I met with a friend who, in the course of 
gossiping, asked me if I’d heard about an episode which had occurred that winter which “had the 
whole town in an uproar”? A Beit Sahouri woman - “a bad woman, but Orthodox” - had 
surreptitiously married a Muslim man (whose name or provenance was not proffered, although the 
location of the place where they lived immediately after the marriage implies he was Beit Sahouri). 
When her family found out it tried to get her back, but she and her husband fled to Ta’amra where 
they took shelter with a Bedouin family. Elders from her family, along with the town mayor, went 
to the PNA in Bethlehem to complain and were told by the authorities (who are very sensitive to 
Muslim-Christian issues) that they had no right to interfere. My informant concluded: 
the Sahouris see this as an expression of the threat to them of the Muslims. It used to be that we 
were separated by the mountains from Obadiya [a neighboring Muslim village] but now its 
mosques are on our borders, the Jews are on Jebel abu-Ghneim, and Bethlehem is mixed. 
Everyone is taking over, and now they are beginning to take the women (15.3.99).
In this discourse Beit Sahour has become a very different place from that described in the 
discussions related in the first part of this paper. There Beit Sahour was a Palestinian village made 
up of Christians and Muslims who shared in everything, and particularly in their solidarity in the 
face of the national enemy (who was ‘Israeli’, not ‘Jewish’). Here, on the other hand, “we...the 
Sahouris” are Christian and deeply threatened by other religious communities (“Muslims” and 
“Jews”) pressing on our borders from all sides and now, most frighteningly, “beginning to take the 
women”. 
What is invisible in this discourse is the Beit Sahouri Muslims who constitute a minority 
population within the borders of a largely Christian town which is located within a national 
territory in which Muslims are the majority population. The man in this story, who has stolen the 
daughter of his Christian neighbors and, by marrying her, turned her into a Muslim, is, like the 
third man in the killing of Basem Rishmawi, the internal trace of an antagonism which Beit 
Sahouran Christians rarely discuss, and then only as something ‘outside’. Neither of the two, 
however, acted from ‘outside’; it was from within Beit Sahour that they had effaced Christian 
identities through murder and seduction. 
Throughout my notebooks as far back as my earliest intifada work in Beit Sahour there is a shadow 
discourse which haunts Beit Sahouri assertions of strong commensality and communality between 
Muslims and Christians. Christian Beit Sahouris spoke - in tones which in 1990 were hushed and 
somewhat embarrassed yet which, as my records get closer to the present day, become more open 
and assertive - of the threat of the Muslims elsewhere in Palestine, of their covetousness about 
Christian wealth, of their intolerance for religious and cultural difference, and of the impossibility 
of coexistence with them. This material was always just under the surface, but it didn’t 
predominate and only served to organize perceptions (and assertions) at certain moments - and 
then only in relation to Muslims outside of Beit Sahour. Even now it is extremely rare to hear a 
Beit Sahouri Christian say something negative about a fellow townsperson who is Muslim, and 
when they do it is criticism of particular individuals which link them to a generalised outside 
collectivity (e.g., ‘so and so is like a Khalili [Hebronite]’). I have never heard a Beit Sahouri 
Muslim criticise a Beit Sahouri Christian as a Christian. 
The unnamed and unpursued ‘third man’, like the unnamed and unlocalized Muslim husband 
about whom everyone in Beit Sahour was allegedly talking (but not to me), is a reminder of what 
must not be brought into the open. Although Beit Sahouris have always been Christian Beit 
Sahouris and Muslim Beit Sahouris, a chilling realisation is growing as the threat of Israeli military 
dominion appears to recede. Without the presence of ‘an enemy who is enemy to us both’, forms of 
self and communal assertion which had previously been sublimated in the interest of asserting 
solidarity are coming to serve as ‘models of’ and ‘models for’ the social (see Geertz 1973: 93-94). To 
be reminded that the antagonism between Muslim and Christian, which the ideologues of both 
religions increasingly assert, is not simply an antagonism between an inside and an outside but 
even more saliently an antagonism inside Beit Sahour is to be reminded of the impossibility of 
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the men in revenge for the previous day’s knifing of an Israeli tax collector in Gaza 
city. 
7
 I discuss this imbrication of antagonism, identification and identity at greater 
length and with critical reference to Benedict Anderson’s theory of the genesis of 
imagined community in “A Country of Words: Conceiving the Palestinian Nation 
from the Position of Exile” (Bowman 1994: 140-147 and 161-162).
8
 This assertion of the ease with which Beit Sahour could return to its ‘agricultural 
roots’ is somewhat idealized, although townspersons did attempt to do so during 
the intifada to escape dependency on Israeli markets (see Frankel 1994: 42-66, 
Hunter 1991: 144-145 and 211-212, Schiff and Ya'ari 1990: 247-248 and 
Robinson 1997: 74-76). Beit Sahour, unlike neighboring villages, was established 
on lands rented from Bethlehem landlords, and its inhabitants worked to develop 
strategies for gathering money with which to purchase land. From the eighteenth 
century until recently, Sahouri men engaged in labour migration to the area around 
Nablus where they worked as stone cutters. In the nineteenth century the Latin 
church sponsored the development of an artisanal crafts industry focused on 
carving mother of pearl and olive wood for the tourist trade. Consequently Beit 
Sahour was largely independent of agriculture by 1967 and prepared to take 
advantage of Israel’s drive to increase commodity circulation (and market 
dependence) in the Territories (see Mansour 1988 and the essays on occupation 
economics in Abed 1988).
9
 Shqeef is Beaufort Castle in South Lebanon. Fateh held it from 1970 until 1982, 
even during the Israeli invasion of 1978. Tell al-Za’ter resisted a several month 
siege by Maronite militia in early 1976 (personal communication from Rosemary 
Sayigh).
10
 Speaking of the Ottoman period, one man said “people here were under people 
who claimed to be Muslims but who oppressed the Muslims too. They had to ask 
themselves ‘what are we? Is this a religious war or not? Is this an occupation?” 
(11.1.90).
11
 Nonetheless the constant emphasis on the town’s resistance to the Israeli 
occupation indicated that it was in this particular struggle that the community 
realized the quiddity of its identity.
12
 Although I note the proviso here that this particular discourse might have been 
produced solely for the ears of an outsider, I do not believe this to be the case. 
Internal solidarity, which was extremely strong despite the oppressive challenges 
posed to it during this period, depended on the verisimilitude of assertions of 
communal solidarity. Furthermore a text in Arabic - The White Revolution in the 
Disobedient City - published in 1990 by Izzat Dragma, a Beit Sahouri, also validates 
and circulates the elements I note above. 
13
 Townsfolk, Christian and Muslim alike, consistently stated that the Muslim 
population was between twenty five and thirty percent. The 1997 census, which 
collected but did not publicize figures on religious affiliation, shows a population of 
11,250 of which 7,972 were over twelve years of age and 620 over 65 (Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics 1999: 50 and 55).
14
 The Oslo Agreements barred access to Jerusalem to all but the very few who could 
attain permits from the military authorities, etiolated trade links between West Bank 
businesses, and forced un- or alternative employment onto many workers who had 
after 1967 become dependent on working in Israel. Since 1993 per capita income 
on the West Bank has dropped by 23% (personal communication from Graham 
Usher). 
15
 “[W]ith this ‘exterior’ we are not reintroducing the category of the extra-discursive. 
The exterior is constituted by other discourses. It is the discursive nature of this 
exterior which creates the conditions of vulnerability of every discourse, as nothing 
finally protects it against the deformation and destabilization of its system of 
differences by other discursive articulations which act from outside it” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 146. n. 20).
16
 I use this neologism to  distinguish the elimination of communal consciousness 
focused on territory and distinct identity from either genocide (physical destruction 
of an entire people) or ethnicide (destruction of a group’s culture and language); 
see, for the latter terms, the papers in State Violence and Ethnicity (van den Berghe 
1990). 
17
 See Land and Power (Shapira 1992) on the ideological redefinition of Zionism’s 
project in the face of resistance, and the Israeli revisionist historians (Morris 1987; 
Morris 1990; Pappe 1992; and Shlaim 2000) on anti-Palestinian violence in the 
state’s foundation and consolidation. Lustick (1980) remains excellent on attempts 
to stifle Palestinian consciousness during the early years of the Israeli state.
18
 I was told in 1994, before the ‘second death’, that “no Christian or Muslim has ever 
been killed by another here” (21.7.94).
19
 Persons involved in negotiations between the Qumsiyyeh and Rishmawi families 
denied this story’s vivid details, attributing both them and the abandoned file to 
gossip. Tellingly, when I asked those who spoke of the file why someone would 
have left such a revealing artifact, they replied with variations on one man’s 
succinct answer - “to tear us apart” (17.4.98). 
20
 Formally the Harakat al-Rawabet al-Filistiniyya (‘Movement of Palestinian 
Leagues’), these were set up in 1981 by the orientalist Menahim Milson who the 
new Likud government appointed head of the Civil Administration of the West Bank. 
The leagues simultaneously functioned to mediate between the military government 
and local communities (providing family reunion permits, travel permits, driving 
licenses, jobs in the civil service, building permits, abrogations of house demolition 
orders, intercessions on behalf of jailed relatives, and reductions in prison 
sentences) and to organize and run proxy military units dedicated to the 
destruction of the PLO and the intimidation and closure of institutions providing 
civil alternatives to Israeli structures of governance (Tamari 1983, see also Aronson 
1990: 248-253).
21
 Not only was there no trial but, according to one informant, no record of Faez’s 
confession was kept and he and Sammer were held under charges distinct from 
anything relating to Basem’s murder (11.3.99).
22
 The details of procedure and terminology in tribal law pertaining to murder are laid 
out comprehensively in Aref el-Aref’s Bedouin Love, Law and Legend (El-Aref 1944: 
86-115) which is based on his work among the Beersheba badu in the 1930s. Hilma 
Granqvist gives a wonderfully detailed description of traditional dealings with 
matters of unnatural deaths in the 1920s in the village of Artas, which borders on 
Beit Sahour (Granqvist 1965: 110-132). Cohen (Cohen 1965: 139-145) and, more 
recently, Ginat (Ginat 1987) describe and analyze blood disputes in Israel/Palestine 
while Peters’s functionalist study of the feud amongst segmentary North African 
Bedouin is useful for ethnographic detail (Peters 1990: 59-83). The classic study of 
Mediterranean feuding is, of course, Cohesive Force (Black-Michaud 1975).
23
 A Catholic informant told me: “It is standard practice to take daughters from the 
Orthodox and return them to the Orthodox” (4.4.98). This arrangement, while not 
prescriptive, is quite common. Christian-Muslim marriages are rare, usually only 
involving Beit Sahouris ‘outside’ in diaspora (but see below for a recent case and its 
consequences). See Holy 1989, Donnan 1988, and Geertz 1979 on the logic and 
function of parallel cross cousin marriage. 
24
 376 households could be categorized as belonging to ‘refugees’ out of a total of 
2306 (data collected December 1997). 
25
 Although the murder had happened fourteen years earlier, the adult males of 
Faez’s and Sammer’s immediate families went into hiding since - according to the 
rules of tribal law - they were liable to vengeance killing by Rishmawis until the 
terms of a truce were reached (as long as, in the words of Cohen’s informants, “the 
grave of the victim is still open” Cohen 1965: 139). Faez and, by then, Sammer were 
in prison (and Bishara in Israeli-controlled Jerusalem), but according to atwah all 
males from the killer’s clan over twelve and not elderly are vulnerable to attack 
(Haddad 1920: 105). In the Beit Sahouri instance, however, not only did the town’s 
ethos militate against anything more than nominal observance of the rules but the 
other Qumsiyyehs’s denunciations of the crime were seen to absolve them of 
responsibility. 
26
 Such a declaration by members of the extended ’ailah of their ‘innocence’ of - 
non-implication with - the killer is called i‘lān barā‘a (see Cohen 1965: 144, n. 1). 
Among the Bedouin with whom El-Aref worked it is called tulu’ (El-Aref 1944: 88).
27
 The maglis is the traditional reception room of a Palestinian house, and the site 
wherein public occasions pertaining to the family take place (see Gilsenan 1982: 
181-187 for Lebanese parallels). In situations such as those described above, the 
maglis of the elder representative of the family group will serve as the meeting 
point of all family representatives and those ‘outsiders’ they host. 
28
 The accuracy of their feeling is testified to by the statement of one Rishmawi, a 
member of the national camp, who told me “since the early sixties we had been 
working to diminish the authority and influence of the hamula” [14.1.99].
29
 Cohen (1965: 68-71) and Granqvist (1965: 117-123) provide examples of 
accidental deaths necessitating negotiations and payments.
30
 Traditionally the representatives of the offender approach the family of the victim 
as soon as possible after the transgression, thus indicating their desire to prevent 
vengeance and to reestablish balance in the community. In such cases the 
miscreant’s willingness to put himself (or be put by his kin) in the hands of those he 
has made enemies is countered by the victim’s family’s sacrifice of prestige in its 
openness to making an arrangement. Black-Michaud points out that “the victim’s 
group, whose sacred duty it was to avenge their kinsman’s death..., were, by 
accepting arbitration, diminishing somewhat their stature in the eyes of public 
opinion by this willingness to procrastinate for motives of a material nature” (Black-
Michaud 1975: 92). 
 
31
 The qaadi’s religious status is analogous to that of other blood money arbitrators 
such as the Cyrenaican marabtin bi’l Baraka (Peters 1990: 64) and the Berber 
igurramen (Gellner 1969). The victim’s family chooses the qaadi but the 
perpetrator’s family must agree the choice and pay wages and expenses. 
32
 £17,866 or $28,170 at the September 1995 rate of exchange. This was a relatively 
low settlement considering the nature of the crime. It can be compared with the 
12,000 dinars a local factory owner was forced by arbitration to pay one of his 
workers when his gun accidently went off and grazed the man’s neck (15.12.99). 
33
 The story of the policeman dispersing the crowd was told me by the man involved 
(16.12.97 and 19.12.99). Several other people have told me that Bishara was in the 
house and had fired on the crowd (passim).
34
 Although all the other adult males of Bishara and Sammer’s family were legitimate 
targets for vengeance killing, people with whom I talked claimed, in the words of 
one informant, that only Bishara and Sammer were liable to be murdered “because 
they have not attempted to resolve the case” (18.12.97).
 
35
 That version is given credibility by the fact that within a week Sammer was released 
from prison, allegedly because there was no one alive and in reach of the PNA who 
could testify against him.
36
 Informants claimed that in the past all Beit Sahouris attended all marriages, 
baptisms, and funerals, but now people “are required to go [only] to funerals”, 
treating all else as family affairs (16.11.93). Observation reveals that now only 
friends, families, and members of the same religious community attend funerals, 
but Qumsiyyehs and Rishmawis are members of the same hamula and are affiliated 
to the same church so failure to attend each other’s funerals is a visible assertion of 
division.
